



## Introduction: securitization and shrinking of citizenship

Guy Ben-Porat & As'ad Ghanem

To cite this article: Guy Ben-Porat & As'ad Ghanem (2017): Introduction: securitization and shrinking of citizenship, *Citizenship Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/13621025.2017.1380652](https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2017.1380652)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2017.1380652>



Published online: 24 Sep 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



## Introduction: securitization and shrinking of citizenship

Guy Ben-Porat<sup>a</sup> and As'ad Ghanem<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel; <sup>b</sup>School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

### ABSTRACT

The Arab Spring provides for a comparative study and debate on Citizenship, its expansion, and shrinkage. Ironically, the demands for citizenship in the Middle East have risen in a period when the model of liberal citizenship in established democracies appears to be in crisis. The grim results of the Arab Spring had influences beyond the region as instability, militant Islam, and civil wars drove many to seek refuge in Europe and underscored new debates on citizenship and belonging, often questioning the European liberal creed of citizenship, a model for some of the protestors in the Middle East. Right wing parties across the continent gained popularity by demanding to restore or instill an ethno-national citizenship regime. Securitization, a discourse that emphasizes 'danger' to the stability and public order of society, led governments to undertake steps to stave off potential challenges to their control of the state and hegemony over the public sphere and restrict citizenship access and rights. Thus, across the Middle East and Europe, a new phenomenon that we label the 'Shrinking nature of Citizenship', the decline and reduction of the rights of certain segments of society, has taken place, in different forms and with different oppositions.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 11 December 2016  
Accepted 29 August 2017

### KEYWORDS

Securitization; shrinking citizenship; Arab spring; immigration; fundamentalism

The series of protests and uprisings in 2011, soon known as the Arab Spring, challenged and undermined political regimes in the Middle East with popular demands for democratization and citizenship rights. From Sidi Bouzud in the center of Tunisia, protests spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the Gulf States and inspired protests elsewhere in the world. In the Arab world, the protests against governments in demand for political, civic, and economic rights have seemed to echo the familiar model of citizenship and raised hopes and optimism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Arab Spring is a global event not only because of the influence of global technology and discourse used by the protestors, but also because its impact and influence stretched beyond the confines of the Arab world. Across the Arab world, demands for democracy echoed 'western' concepts of citizenship and rights. Even the term 'Arab Spring' itself recalled earlier European historic moments, the 1848 European 'Spring of Nations' and the 1968 'Prague Spring'. Ironically, the demands for citizenship in the Middle East have risen in a period when the model of liberal citizenship in established democracies appears to be in crisis. Inspiration and influences, consequently, were not one

**CONTACT** Guy Ben-Porat  gbp@bgu.ac.il

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

sided. Citizens in Europe and the United States who were protesting against their government's policies in demand for social justice and equality were quick to identify with the young people in the Middle East who took to the streets, often risking their lives, demanding a change of the regime. Demonstrators in Tel-Aviv who occupied a main street for several weeks, to take one example, referred directly to Tahrir square in Egypt as an inspiration.

Did the Arab Spring bring with it a renewed and expanded citizenship? In the Middle East, with few exceptions, the expectations of the citizens who took to the streets have not materialized. Some of the old regimes survived the challenges by force or by offering small changes and the new regimes offered little change in citizenship rights. The grim results of the Arab Spring had influences beyond the region as instability, militant Islam, and civil wars drove many to seek refuge in Europe and underscored new debates on citizenship and belonging, often questioning the European liberal creed of citizenship, a model for some of the protestors in the Middle East. Right wing parties across the continent gained popularity by demanding to restore or instill an ethno-national citizenship regime. Thus, across the Middle East and Europe, a new phenomenon that we label the 'Shrinking nature of Citizenship' seems to take place.

Shrinking refers to the decline and reduction of the right of certain segments of society subsequent to intentional and pre-planned actions by the state. As a rule, this phenomenon follows either an imagined or actual sense of 'danger' to the stability and public order of society. As a result of processes such as the empowerment of anti-democratic or anti-establishment actors, the growth of fundamentalist religious movements, waves of immigrants, demands raised by minorities, the erosion of the welfare state, economic crises, and other related developments, some governments have undertaken steps to stave off potential challenges to their control of the state and hegemony over the public sphere. Others, especially in Europe faced new and often contradictory demands in face of rising immigration, the potential for more massive immigration, and a securitization discourse.

The Arab Spring provides for a comparative study and debate on Citizenship, its expansion, and shrinkage. Specifically, we are interested in how changing security debates and concerns following the 'Arab Spring' implicated citizenship regimes and debates of citizen's duties, obligations, and rights, as well as questions of inclusion and exclusion pertinent to citizenship. 'Shrinking citizenship' is presented and discussed in this volume in practices of restrictions of political participation, discriminatory policies targeting specific political groups and activists, anti-democratic laws, the expansion of anti-democratic political culture, changes in regulations toward asylum seekers, and a gradual retreat from free movement across Europe and the Middle East due to security situations and terror events.

## Citizenship and democracy

Citizenship is the most important foundation upon which the modern state guarantees the egalitarian status and rights of individuals within its territory. These include equality before the law, protection against the tyranny of the state and/or the majority, as well as a range of civil, political, and economic rights such as participating in general and local elections, the right to hold political office, and the right of self-autonomy (Held 1990). In the context of majority-minority relations, citizenship ensures equality and balance between individuals and collectives, serves as the main component for engendering common bonds to the state, and functions as a basic mechanism that underpins the stability of the political system

(Lijphart 1984; Kymlicka 1995). The extant literature typically stresses the linear nature of citizenship and the expansion of citizen empowerment and rights. Since its inception in England in the thirteenth century and development throughout continental Europe, North America, Eastern Europe, South America, and the rest of the world, citizenship has gradually acquired a more important status, despite a long and tumultuous history of expansion and growth. In addition, the literature on citizenship refers to both the concept and status of the citizen as a 'closed box' situation, with a clear set of rights and duties alongside a very limited and restricted number of exceptional circumstances that allow exclusions and limitations.

The scholarly literature overwhelmingly considers equal citizenship as one of the most basic principles of a democratic state (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Axtmann 1996; Collier and Levitski 1997). Citizenship is a 'set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups' (Turner 1993, 2). Differently stated, it is the right to have rights, whose scope and content are negotiated or fought over, between the sovereign state and those who reside within its boundaries. As such, it is a process of social inclusion that provides members of a political community with social status, social rights, and the right to take part in collective decision-making (Ben-Porat and Turner 2011). Citizenship, however, is often a contested ground for individual and group rights, inclusion and exclusion, and the very definition of the political community.

Because different practices underscore the dynamic social construction of citizenship, a unitary theory of citizenship seems inappropriate (Turner 1993, 11). The growth of citizenship in the West – from the city state to the nation state and the expansion of rights to different groups – seemed to suggest, however, for a while at least, that the nation state and citizenship became global norms (Castles 2005) and the European citizenship was a model for other states. Thus, while citizenship is a modern and Western idea difficult to dissociate from the development of urban civil society, many societies outside the West, as a result of conquest or modernization, adopted the ideas and concepts of civil society and citizenship (Turner 1993, vii). At the same time, however, this expansion of citizenship offered new trajectories and different sets of rights and duties.

In Marshall's classic theory (1950), citizenship evolves and expands in a uniform and linear manner as rights accumulate and democracy develops. The linear expansion of citizenship from civil to political rights and from there to social rights, and the extension of its scope to more individuals and to new domains of rights universalizes citizenship and turns into a model for states and societies across the world. The unitary concept of citizenship and the ascribed linear development were challenged both by contradictions within states and hierarchies of citizenship and by global changes. Marshall's categories of citizenship – civil, political, and social – have largely focused on class divisions and ignored both religion and ethnicity, markers of identity that became central to societies transformed by globalization (Ben-Porat and Turner 2011). Also, contrary to Marshall's scheme of citizenship, evolving from civil to political and social, the development of citizenship rights has often been cumulative and uneven (Pakulski 1997), providing different sets of demands and rights to different groups. Citizenship, resting on a common or imagined solidarity (Turner 2001), was/is at the same time a process of exclusions and hierarchies. Consequently, gaps can be detected between the discourse of citizenship, often expanding, and its practices that for different reasons may move in opposite directions and face different demands.

Contrary to the description of citizenship as linear and uniform, it often involves hierarchies and divisions and, as a result, is challenged either by demands for rights and entitlements or by changes that undermine notions of common or imagined solidarity (Turner 2001). These demands can open up citizenship for more rights and inclusions and a change of citizenship regimes. But, opposite developments are also possible, frustrating minorities or immigrants expecting inclusion and equality. Thus, exclusions can be re-inscribed when the state is challenged by internal conflicts or external pressures (Marx 2002), and, similarly, political rights can be limited for the sake of stability and security as witnessed in recent years. As Turner explains, 'Who gets citizenship clearly indicates the prevailing formal criteria of inclusion/exclusion within a political community, and how these resources – following citizenship membership – are allocated and administered largely determines the economic fate of individuals and families' (2000, 38).

Citizenship, in other words can both expand and shrink, and citizenship rights can be unequally divided between individuals and groups. Globalization raises new questions of identity and belonging, and the meaning of citizenship. In 2004, a special issue of *Citizenship Studies* has poignantly asked 'what is left of citizenship?', delineating a 'citizenship gap' of rights and benefits of citizens across the globe. The historical description of linear expansion, in scope and content, was replaced with concerns that the trend has reversed. Erosion of citizenship, among other things, is a response to globalization that undermined the welfare state, transformed national cultures, increased the mobility of people across national boundaries, and changed the meaning of national space, overall creating a hierarchy of citizenship, within and between states (Castles 2005). Globalization, as commonly argued, reduces the historic sovereignty of nation states and undermines the significance of domestic politics and citizenship. Reality, however, is more complex and while globalization presents new challenges to states, it also encourages domestic political debates and at times strengthens 'local' identities.

The crisis, real or perceived, of the nation and the state influences the way citizenship is debated and enacted. In times of crisis, the linear or accumulative nature of citizenship may change in scope and content. Citizenship rights might become constricted, limited, or securitized, and, more importantly, forego their universal structure, introducing new hierarchies and exclusions. Globalization brought with it growing insecurity and security practices that strayed away from liberal ideas of equality and freedom. The securitization of citizenship and its reshaping as 'identity management' (Muller 2004), that began in the wake of September 11th, has taken new turns since. Thus, 'In the ensuing climate of fear, states can flex their muscles with greater impunity, constricting citizenship practices by using national security as a justification' (Dobrowolsky 2007). The use of discourses and images of threat and insecurity in the politics of citizenship and immigration policies, and new technologies of governance introduced by democratic states, such as biometric technologies to manage citizenship (Muller 2004) demonstrate the securitization of citizenship. Yet, for different countries and regions, the concept of citizenship, and its securitization, received different shapes and forms, and involved different debates and political processes.

### Citizenship and democracy in the Arab world

The series of events titled 'The Arab Spring' reflect political, social, and cultural developments that have been occurring throughout the world for several decades. During these

decades, basic contradictions between democratic and anti-democratic have come to the fore in many Arab states amidst regime formations and change. The Arab world is unique, however, in that 'democratic incentives' and concomitant changes in various domains existed simultaneously with gradually intensifying anti-democratic regime responses that have the effect of immobilizing or freezing the political structure of the regimes. As many regimes initiated an Arab version of 'hybrid democracy', the gradual democratization process raised hope among the public and some of the elites that an age of democracy and equal citizenship was imminent.

Hybrid democracy consisted of ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal, or even authoritarian traits. In Arab states such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, and Qatar, for example, democratization processes have been used to control the system, rather than to authentically reform or replace the authoritarian regime. The relative movement toward democratic procedures, an open market, and open and free media, in addition to rapidly increasing Internet connections and growing numbers of young Arabs who have graduated from Western universities and colleges led to the intensification of the contradictions within Arab states/regimes. As a result, increasing dissatisfaction with authoritarianism and its manifestation in the public sphere enforced a growing desire to change the regimes and replace them with more democratic ones. The heightened expectations that followed initial steps toward democratization turned to waves of unrest and deterioration of public trust in the state, unrest and distrust that ultimately spawned the so-called spring of the Arab Peoples.

Historically, citizenship in the Arab world can be traced to the first wave of constitutionalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The constitutional experiment in different Arab countries included the adoption of political concepts and their adaptation to Arabic, including citizenship. Consequently, the Arabic *ra'iyyah*, a word that captures the notion of a subject (also a herd, flock), was replaced by the more abstract *ra'iyyah*, expressing the notion of citizenship, which became synonymous with a new term, that of *muwatin*, i.e. a person connected to a *watan*, a nationhood (Challand 2013, 4). In practice, citizenship rights, civic and political, lagged behind, but the non-democratic regimes granted some social rights in order to gain legitimacy. Popular support of regimes has often relied on state intervention in the economy that provided subsidies and employment, social rights substituting for civil and political rights (Durac and Cavatorta 2015, 22).

A robust democracy, as often argued, requires an expanding middle class with a commitment to liberal tolerance, a viable media, voluntary associations, and a universal notion of citizenship (Turner 2000). The lack of most conditions and especially the reluctance of the Arab regimes to provide citizenship rights and democratize defied scholars' expectations for change as the regimes proved stable. Consequently, studies of Middle East politics gradually moved from a 'transition paradigm' that examined the shifts toward and away from democracy and expected change, to a paradigm of 'authoritarian persistence' that attempted to explain the region's resistance to democratic changes. The persistence of democracy was classified in many researches and books as the 'Arab Exceptionalism' that argues that Arabs are not capable to develop toward democracy due to basic social and cultural characteristics, and that the move toward democracy and equal citizenship is unlikely. Whether exceptionalism was right or not, regimes described as revolutionary (in Syria or Iraq, for example)

failed to meet expectations of facilitating broad public participation and degenerated into personal dictatorships or bureaucratic authoritarianism (Butenschon 2000, 10).

The Arab Spring defied again, even if momentarily, the common ideas about the Middle East's exceptionalism. The young people who took to the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries of the region challenged the 'authoritarian persistence' and the 'Arab exceptionalism' paradigms, suggesting that active citizenship and democracy might be possible. Thus, if the Arab countries were considered the last battalion against democracy and democratization, the popular uprisings re-appropriated 'by subjects of despotic regimes, who sought to reconfigure themselves as political activists' (Levy 2014). This 'activated citizenship' that emerged in different countries did not take part through the formal and institutionalized civil society. Rather, it was individual actions and non-formal mobilization, 'outside the expected parameters of civil activism' triggered by events (Cavatorta 2012).

The Arab Spring was about political pluralism, accountability, socio-economic rights, and the end to arbitrary rule and corruption (Durac and Cavatorta 2015). For some enthusiastic interpreters, the Arab Spring and the demands, 'the people want the fall of the regime', have made obsolete the West vs. Islam binaries as the Arab world no longer needs to compare itself to the West (Challand 2013). Olivier Roy argued that the Arab Spring has signaled the beginning of a process in which democratization is rooted in Arab societies, as a part of a wider process of individualization:

The appeal of democracy is not a consequence of the export of the concept of Western democracy, as fancied by supporters of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. It is the political consequence of social and cultural changes in Arab societies. (2012, 6, 8)

For the demonstrators, the neoliberal reforms that undermined the social contracts and the alienated and arbitrary political rule underscored their demands for civic, political, and social rights.

Citizenship seemed to have flourished in the uprisings when women, people of all age groups, the middle class, and liberal professionals demanded a new social contract and the end of the authoritarian regime. The new social contract demanded included not only civil and political rights that denied hitherto, but also social right that shrunk under the neoliberal reforms the regimes enacted. While Gulf countries were able to react to the unrest with economic inducement, alongside repressive measures (Durac and Cavatorta 2015, 18), other countries did not have the same means. Ordinary Arab citizens rose up against neoliberal reforms imposed by Western organizations like the IMF and the World Bank that led to an even more unequal distribution of wealth in their countries and impoverished the masses over the last two decades and eroded the social contract (Pace and Cavatorta 2012).

Citizens in different Arab countries have made it clear that they wish to have governmental accountability and political and civil rights like their counterparts across the globe (Pace and Cavatorta 2012). Once again the historical interaction between the seemingly 'successful and democratic' Europe and the 'authoritarian and failed' societies in the Middle East ushered social, cultural, and political ideas and practices that inspired masses in the Arab world and the Middle East, including Turkey and Iran. But these developments have also intensified the contradictions that impeded democratic citizenship, including: (a) modern vs. primordial and tribal states; (b) nationalism vs. internal religious and clan divisions; (c) free transnational media vs. state controlled media; (d) nation states vs. transnational ideologies: Islamic, Arab, or otherwise; (e) a liberal economy vs. a closed political space; (f) democratic procedures vs. pseudo democracies; and (g) democratization vs. authoritarianism.

At the eve of the Arab spring, it appeared that Arab societies can no longer contain these contradictions. Consequently, The Arab uprisings introduced a new political subjectivity and shared a common sociological novelty of the 'adherence of the people, *ash-sha'b*, to the notion of citizenship and the collective will to underwrite a new, more inclusive type of social contract' (Challand 2013, 2).

The aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, has ushered new skepticism about the potential of democracy and citizenship in the Middle East. The outcomes of the Arab Spring fell short of the expectations and hopes of its initiators and sympathetic observers. The threat to ruling regimes of the Middle East, on the one hand, and the rise of radical Islam, on the other hand, was a pretext for the curtailment of citizenship rights rather than their expansion. No less important, the collapse of regimes and the ensuing violence and chaos resulted in mass migration to Europe, and new pressure on citizenship regimes. Citizenship, as Turner notes, is a contradictory force that creates simultaneously an internal space of social rights and solidarity and an external, exclusionary force of non-membership (2000, 33). The erosion of citizenship, however, has also been noted in Western countries both in regard to entitlements (Turner 2001) and, central to this issue, the ability to be inclusive and extend rights to newcomers. Thus, the European model itself is challenged by internal developments exacerbated by the migration from Middle East countries in crisis, posing new security dilemmas and raising questions of inclusion and the ability or will of European countries to accept refugees and confer citizenship status.

In the wake of the Arab Spring and part of its consequences, citizenship not only shrank but also 'securitized', legitimating its constriction. Securitization theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, understands security to be a social construct so that any issue can be 'securitized' or made into a 'security issue', 'if it can be intensified to the point where it is presented and accepted as an existential threat' (Williams 2003, 516). Another important contribution of securitization theory is highlighting the assimilation of internal and external security or the 'securitization of the inside' (Bigo 2000). Acts of security seek to provide protection from danger, freedom from doubt, and relief of anxiety. At the same time, however, such acts encourage fear, foster apprehension, and feed off of nervousness in the population (Nyers 2004). Securitization, therefore, can construct specific groups of migrants as 'threatening' national identity, state sovereignty, and/or social stability (Squire 2015). Not only migrants, also minorities within countries or political oppositions to existing orders can all become securitized questioning democratic citizenship. Thus, minorities can suffer unfair treatment when their states feel insecure and fearful of neighboring enemies.

In this issue, we examine the securitization of citizenship in three European and two Middle Eastern democratic regimes in the wake of the Arab Spring. In his study of Turkey, Aviad Rubin explores the impact of securitization on the ability of Turkish citizens to exercise civil and political rights associated with citizenship. The shadow of security has impacted civil and political citizenship rights in Turkey since the inception of the modern Turkish republic and intensified as a result of the regional turmoil in the Middle East. Turkish citizenship was reconstituted since 1982 by two contradictory yet related developments. First, the decline of Kemalist hegemony eased restrictions on the freedom of expression and association and allowed the rise of an Islamic counter-elite. Second, was the erosion of the institutional structure of the state and of liberal and secular values replaced by populist and conservative ideas that the AKP brought to the fore. The Arab Spring and the regional



instability ensued: the collapse of Syria, waves of immigrants crossing into Turkey Kurdish national demands, and the rise of ISIS which led to heightened security concerns, real and manipulated, and the constriction of citizenship rights. Political rights were curtailed by the imprisonment of journalists, prohibition of access to social media outlets, and repression of protests. Civil rights were limited by the intervention in individual preferences and lifestyles, such as the consumption of alcohol, procreation, and sexual preferences. Authoritarianism and the sidelining of pluralism and liberalism leaped after the failed coup attempt in July 2016 that prompted emergency laws which allow wide-ranging restriction on civil and political rights.

Israel's description of a nonliberal democracy, 'ethnic democracy' or 'ethnocracy' is explained, among other things, by the status of Arab or Palestinian citizens in a Jewish state. Israel's efforts to consolidate its Jewish Character, argue Ghanem and Khatib, by and large prevent the possibility for equal status to Palestinian citizens. The dual commitment to the Jewish character of the state and to a democratic form of government has adverse consequences for Palestinian citizens limiting their ability to exercise their citizenship rights (Peled 1992). The increasing efforts to consolidate the Jewish identity of the state, and the securitization discourse involved, resulted in further shrinking of the citizenship of Arabs in Israel and calls for measures and laws restricting their citizenship and rights. As the consolidation of the Jewish state, through legislation and policies, is framed as a security concern in face of a changing Middle East, the very demand of Arab citizens for equality, hereby rejecting the Jewish character of the state, turns their demands for equality into a threat to Israeli national security.

Securitization has impacted citizenship not only in nonliberal democracies like Turkey and Israel but also in Western democracies facing immigration from North Africa and the Middle East. The challenges that this migration brings about, to immigrants and receiving societies alike, are securitized so that migration and large groups of migrants are seen primarily, if not exclusively, as an urgent security threat. Consequently, political mobilization against the admission of migrants and refugees depicts newcomers as short- and long-term security threats to public order. In Germany, as Banai and Kreide illustrate, the ambivalence of human rights persists because they become instrumental to 'securitizing' migration and migrants. In the securitization discourse, immigrants posit an immediate threat of violence and a long-term threat to social peace and economic prosperity. This dual threat to external and internal boundaries excludes migrants from the egalitarian promise of citizenship. Consequently, a deep and longstanding ambivalence toward inclusion and equality in citizenship rights *and* human rights emerged as large number of refugees arrived at the gates of Europe.

Muslims in France, by their very presence, challenge common notions of citizenship and the idea of laicite, inseparable from citizenship. In her study of Muslim citizens in France, Barras demonstrates how laicite is referred to by politicians and policy-makers to delimit the place of Islam in the French Republic. Against growing security concerns, *Laïcité* has been mobilized in an effort to securitize French citizenship, ensuring that citizens perform the values of the Republic, while delimiting and protecting them from 'inauthentic' and 'threatening' ways of being. The more intensive and extensive use of laicite was coupled with a discourse of radicalization, projecting an image of French Muslims defined almost exclusively in terms of a fixed and rigid religious identity, which is constructed as incompatible with 'the Republic'. The fight against radicalism is constructed as being almost exclusively

one against Islam, implemented to locate, manage, and securitize a ‘religious problem.’ Muslim citizens, however, did not remain passive and took action as activist citizens in order to de-securitize citizenship.

Concerns with the seeming lack of common values underscore also the introduction of a duty on Schools and the Further Education (FE) institutions (sixth form colleges and independent training providers) in England and Wales to promote British values under the Counter-Terrorism and Security. McGhee and Zhang examine how the alleged retreat from multiculturalism in the UK has been expressed in terms of a change from the ‘live and let live’ of liberalism associated most recently with state-level multiculturalism to a more ‘muscular liberalism’ instituted in schools and politicizing British values. Muscular liberalism is a reconstructive citizenship intervention designed not just to reproduce a political order, but to remedy a perceived significant failure in the political system, namely the alleged failure of Education systems to produce liberal British Citizens. The concern that certain ‘communities’, especially Muslim, were self-segregating and living ‘parallel lives’ has led to ‘securitized requirements’ to promote ‘fundamental British values’ to safeguard children and young people from radicalization and extremism. While government securitization attempts could have alienated communities, eventually, McGhee and Zhang argue, schools and colleges have used discretion and ameliorated the policies. As such, they were able to filter out some of the ‘muscularity’ imposed from above and find more subtle ways for introducing a reflexive, open-minded, and tolerant variety of British citizenship.

In conclusion, the changing conceptions and practices of citizenship described in the different articles of this volume demonstrate that regardless of its globalization and universal modes of membership (Urry 1999), citizenship remains strongly connected to states and state policies. Security threats, real and imagined, and a securitization discourse enable states to constrain citizenship rights (Turkey) or minority rights (Israel), to limit the entry of refugees and migrants, to label migrants as security threat, and to withdraw from liberal values of tolerance. Similarly, securitization demonstrates that despite the erosion of citizenship through the transformation of work, war, and parenthood (Turner 2001), citizenship can still expand and constrict, implicating hierarchies and exclusions. The fact that citizenship is about security and often through bounded communities makes belonging valuable allows communities to restrict entries and place demands upon those who belong and even more so on those who want to belong.

Citizenship can be securitized but also de-securitized, as it shifts into ‘normal politics’ (Roe 2004) and questions of citizenship are considered at face value or vis-à-vis moral ethics extended to other groups hitherto excluded or marginalized. But the very nature of collective identities creates propitious conditions for societal security dilemmas (Ibid). Securitization of citizenship in the wake of the Arab Spring affected not only Middle Eastern countries but also European countries, fed by and exacerbating existing fears and concerns leading to the shrinkage of citizenship. The politicization of Islam in the West, as Cesari (2009) argues, cannot be disconnected from religious contexts of Muslims in the Muslim world.

Obviously, as the different cases demonstrate, shrinking of citizenship can be part of a non-democratic regime change (Turkey), against a national minority (Israel) or against Muslim immigrants, and perceived to be a threat to national identity and culture, and potentially radicalizing. The entrenchment of security concerns in citizenship debates provides a challenge for those who aspire for a more egalitarian and exclusive citizenship. The struggles of French Muslims to express their identity, demands of Arab citizens for equality, Turkish

opposition, initiatives of British educators to ameliorate muscular citizenship, and German governments' decision to allow immigrants in, in spite of opposition, are all examples of de-securitizing citizenship.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## References

- Axtmann, Ronald. 1996. *Liberal Democracy into the Twenty-First Century: Globalization, Integration, and the Nation-State*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ben-Porat, Guy, and Bryan Turner. 2011. "Introduction: Contemporary Dilemmas of Israeli Citizenship." In *The Contradictions of Israeli Citizenship*, edited by Guy Ben-Porat and Bryan Turner, 1–12. London: Routledge.
- Bigo, D. 2000. "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe." In *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, edited by M. Kelstrup and M. Williams, 171–205. London: Routledge.
- Butenschon, Nils A. 2000. "State Power and Citizenship in the Middle East." In *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, edited by N. A. Butenschon, U. Davis, and M. Hassassian, 28–49. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Castles, Stephen. 2005. "Nation and Empire: Hierarchies of Citizenship in the New Global Order." *International Politics* 42: 203–224.
- Cavatorta, Francesco. 2012. *The Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society*. [http://www.iemed.org/observatori-es/arees-danalisi/arxiu-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/Cavatorta\\_en.pdf](http://www.iemed.org/observatori-es/arees-danalisi/arxiu-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/Cavatorta_en.pdf).
- Cesari, J. 2009. *The Securitisation of Islam in Europe*. Vol. 15. Brussels: CEPS.
- Benoît Challand. 2013. Citizenship against the Grain: Locating the Spirit of the Arab Uprisings in Times of Counterrevolution. *Constellations* 20 (2): 169–187.
- Collier, D., and S. Levitski. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49 (03): 430–451.
- Dobrowolsky, Alexandra. 2007. "(In)Security and Citizenship: Security, Im/Migration and Shrinking Citizenship Regimes." *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 8 (2): 629–662.
- Durac, Vincent, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2015. *Politics and Governance in the Middle East*. London: Palgrave.
- Held, D. 1990. "The Decline of the Nation State." In *New times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, edited by S. Hall and M. Jacques, 191–204. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104: 352–381.
- Levy, G. 2014. "Contested Citizenship of the Arab Spring and beyond." In *The Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin F. Isin and Peter Nyers, 23–37. London: Routledge.
- Lijphart, A. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Marshall, T.H. 1950. Citizenship and social class (Vol. 11, pp. 28–29). Cambridge.
- Marx, Anthony. 2002. "The Nation-state and Its Exclusions." *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (1): 103–126.
- Muller, Benjamin J. 2004. "(Dis)Qualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and 'Identity Management.'" *Citizenship Studies* 8 (3): 279–294.
- Nyers, P. 2004. "Introduction: What's left of Citizenship?" *Citizenship Studies* 8 (3): 203–215.
- Pace, Michelle, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2012. "The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective – An Introduction." *Mediterranean Politics* 17 (2): 125–138.
- Pakulski, Jan. 1997. "Cultural Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies* 1 (1): 73–86.

- Peled, Yoav. 1992. Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State. *American Political Science Review* 86 (02) 432–443.
- Roe, P. 2004. “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization.” *Security Dialogue* 35 (3): 279–294.
- Roy, Olivier. 2012. “The Transformation of the Arab World.” *Journal of Democracy* 23 (3): 5–18.
- Squire, V. 2015. “The Securitisation of Migration: An absent Presence?” In *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU*, 19–36. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1993. “Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship.” In *Citizenship and Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. Turner, 1–18. London: Sage.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2000. “Islam, Civil Society and Citizenship.” In *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, edited by N. A. Butenshon, U. Davis, and M. Hassassian, 28–49. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2001. “The Erosion of Citizenship.” *British Journal of Sociology* 52 (2): 189–209.
- Urry, J. 1999. “Globalization and Citizenship.” *Journal of World-systems Research* 5 (2): 310–324.
- Williams, M. C. 2003. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4): 511–531.